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Abstract 
Governments’ responsiveness to citizens’ preferences is a key assessment criterion of 
democratic quality. This paper assesses responsiveness to public opinion in European Union 
politics with the example of governments’ position-taking in the Council of the EU. The 
analysis demonstrates that governments’ willingness to adopt negotiation positions that 
reflect public opinion systematically varies with their electoral incentives flowing from 
domestic arenas. Governments behave responsive in EU legislative negotiations if they face 
majoritarian electoral systems at home, when elections are imminent, and when parties or 
EU-related events trigger the public salience of integration. These findings have important 
implications for the debate on the EU’s democratic deficit and our understanding of 
democratic responsiveness outside the national political arena. 
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Democratic Responsiveness in the European 
Union: the Case of the Council 
 
 
 
Assessing the link between policy-making and public opinion has been a 
major concern of representation research since Robert Dahl’s famous notion 
that a key characteristic of democracy is a “continuing responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens” (1971: 1-2). A large body of 
literature from American and comparative political science has investigated 
the extent and conditions under which a variety of elected ‘policy-makers’– 
from presidents, over parliamentarians, to judges – react to the ups and 
downs in public sentiment when they design, negotiate, vote on, and interpret 
policies. In the majority, these studies could establish that policy-making in 
Western democracies is subject to substantial democratic responsiveness (e.g. 
Erikson et al. 2002; Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson et al. 1995; Hakhverdian 
2010, 2012; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 
and Soroka 2012; Wlezien 1995). However, some recent studies have become 
more cautious with generalised claims and stressed policy-makers ability to 
manipulate public opinion (e.g. Jacobs and Shapiro 2000), the perils of ‘over-
responsiveness’ (Lax and Phillips 2012) as well as the stratification of 
responsiveness according to people’s income (Gilens 2012). 
 
Without any doubt democratic responsiveness is one of the major empirical 
assessment criteria of democratic quality in political science. It is therefore 
remarkable that it has rarely been assessed in the context of EU policy-making 
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despite intense debates about the union’s alleged ‘democratic deficit’. This 
article starts from the observation that claims-making about democratic 
responsiveness in the EU plays a key role in the democratic deficit debate. On 
the one hand, liberal intergovernmentalist sceptics of the democratic deficit 
stress that “EU policy-making is, in nearly all cases, (…) responsive to the 
demands of European citizens (…) in a way quite similar to national polities” 
(Moravcsik 2002: 605, 618). On the other hand, the advocates of the 
democratic deficit thesis counter that even if EU policy-making might match 
people’s preferences such a relationship is unlikely to represent stable, 
reliable, and causal public control. Instead, considering the severe lack of 
electoral accountability of EU politics, any correlation between people’s will 
and EU policy-making is unlikely to be more than “happy coincidence” 
(Follesdal and Hix 2006: 556). 
 
This article assesses these claims with regard to the responsiveness of 
individual governments to their domestic public opinion in the Council of the 
European Union (subsequently ‘the Council’). From an empirical perspective, 
this choice is reasonable as the Council has been consistently found to be the 
most influential institution in EU policy-making (compared to the European 
Parliament and the European Commission) (Costello and Thomson 2013; 
Franchino and Mariotto 2012; Thomson 2011). Moreover, national 
governments play the key role in the liberal intergovernmentalist defence of 
EU democracy as they are theorised to be the main advocates of citizens’ 
preferences in Brussels due to their accountability in national elections. This 
accountability is “the most fundamental source of the EU’s legitimacy” 
(Moravcsik 2002: 619) and it renders decisions in the Council “as accountable 
to national citizens as decisions of national cabinets” (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 
539). Even proponents of the deficit thesis seem to admit that national 
governments are the most likely ‘agents of responsiveness’ at the EU level, 
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since national elections are presently more functional in expressing people’s 
preferences than second-order elections to the European Parliament (Hix and 
Marsh 2008). 
 
To assess governments’ responsiveness in the Council, I analyse the impact of 
domestic public opinion on governments’ initial negotiation positions 
towards a subset of legislative proposals published by the European 
Commission between 1996 and 2008. The analysis distinguishes between 
responsiveness on legislative issues that represented left-right conflicts (e.g. 
about the degree of economic regulation) and those that represented pro-anti 
integration conflicts (e.g. about the authority of EU institutions). I argue that 
domestic electoral considerations are central for governments’ responsiveness 
efforts on both dimensions. However, the different roles the dimensions play 
in domestic party competition have important consequences. While 
governments will handle responsiveness on left-right as a ‘routine task’ they 
can highly tailor so as to best adapt their efforts to domestic electoral 
institutions and electoral cycles, responsiveness on pro-anti integration will be 
more of an ‘ad hoc’ nature in response to increasing public salience of the 
issue. 
 
The findings demonstrate that governments’ responsiveness efforts in 
negotiations on EU policies systematically vary with electoral incentives 
flowing from electoral formulas, the electoral cycle, and party competition as 
well as major events related to integration. The picture of responsiveness in 
Council politics that emerges from these results is remarkably close to some of 
the more sceptic accounts of responsiveness in domestic politics. 
Governments may shirk public opinion in contexts of low electoral pressure 
and realise other actors’ or their own policy preferences in the EU arena, but 
they pander to the public when electoral incentives are compelling. Given the 
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comparatively low salience and complex nature of much EU legislation, these 
results are more tangible than one might have expected. The net result 
supports the liberal intergovernmentalist conjecture that governments are 
generally capable of acting as ‘agents of the public’ in the Council, but it 
leaves the open question whether responsiveness on its own and of limited 
degree is enough. 
 
 
The Electoral Connection in EU Policy-Making 
 
In its simplest definition, democratic responsiveness refers to a situation, in 
which different levels of public opinion induce governments to implement 
corresponding levels of public policies (e.g. if people show higher levels of 
support for taxation, the government sets higher tax rates than in times of low 
support for taxation) (cp. Lax and Phillips 2012).1 Traditionally, 
responsiveness is assumed to be highly contingent on democratic elections 
that serve citizens to express their policy-related preferences and hold 
governments accountable for the realisation of these preferences.  
 
Elections induce responsiveness through two main mechanisms (Stimson et 
al. 1995). Firstly, citizens use their vote in elections to (re-)shape the 
composition of parliament and government so that elected policy-makers best 
share their respective policy preferences and are likely to implement 
corresponding policies. This mechanism of ‘electoral turnover’ is 
accompanied by a second that is based on the idea that policy-makers may                                                         1 Responsiveness is often distinguished from ‘congruence’ that does not only refer to correlations between opinion and policy but to an actual match (e.g. if people show support for a new tax rate of 10%, this exact rate is implemented). 
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engage in ‘rational anticipation’ of this turnover. In order to forestall electoral 
sanctions at the end of the legislative term they may align policy-making to 
changes in public preferences during the term. This is achieved through a 
close tracking of and reaction to public opinion as the primary signal of public 
preferences. From a game theoretical perspective, electoral turnover 
highlights the role of elections as adverse selection games, in which citizens 
attempt to select policy-makers that are ‘good’ types sharing their preferences 
(Fearon 1999; Mansbridge 2009). In turn, rational anticipation captures their 
role as sanctioning games, in which policy-makers calculate how much they 
can deviate from the principal’s preferences without being punished at the 
ballot box (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986).  
 
Given the central role of the electoral connection, three characteristics of EU 
politics cast doubts on the potential relevance of responsiveness. A first 
concern pertains to a lack of inherent salience or importance of EU policy-
making for the public. The EU’s core policy competences in the regulation of 
market activities and technical standards arguably carry much less inherent 
salience for voters than areas like social policy, labour market policy, or health 
care. Not surprisingly, the literature has clearly established that issue salience 
increases responsiveness – even though a ‘minimum level’ of salience is hard 
to identify (Lax and Phillips 2009; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 2004). A 
second concern is the complexity of EU policy-making. Many EU issues 
qualify as ‘hard’ issues that are largely technical instead of symbolic (such as 
the definition of technical standards), and the multilevel nature of the EU 
polity makes it hard for voters to identify responsible actors for decisions. 
Issue and polity complexity impair issue voting, and in consequence, 
representational linkages are either weaker or elite-driven (Carmines and 
Stimson 1980; Hill and Hurley 1999; Hurley and Hill 2003; Wlezien and 
Soroka 2012). Lastly, it is an open question whether citizens have enough 
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information about EU policy-making to hold their governments accountable 
as media reporting focuses on national issues. Clearly, adequate information 
provision through media seems to be an important prerequisite for 
responsiveness (Besley and Burgess 2002; Snyder and Strömberg 2008).  
 
While this scepticism about responsiveness in the EU is certainly warranted, it 
probably overstates the obstacles. First of all, latest since the Treaty of 
Maastricht the range of domains the EU deals with has encompassed areas of 
high inherent salience such as immigration, justice and home affairs, 
environmental and animal protection, or monetary affairs. Examples of salient 
EU legislation (included in this analysis) range from the phasing-out of single-
hull oil tankers in Community waters, over the establishment of CO2 
emission trading systems, to redefining the rights of asylum seekers, and 
regulating working times. Secondly, the politicisation of European integration 
since the early 1990s (Hooghe and Marks 2009), primarily driven by a series of 
contentious referendums on integration and efforts by extremist parties to 
electorally mobilise the EU, has affected the other two characteristics. On the 
one hand, parties have been successful in framing EU issues in less complex 
terms by linking them to symbolic concepts like national identity or 
neoliberalism that invoke ‘gut responses’ (e.g. de Vries and Edwards 2009). 
On the other hand, media coverage of the EU has shown an upward trend 
over time, with peaks of attention around key events (Boomgaarden et al. 
2010, 2013). 
 
These changes have enabled EU politics to enter voters’ electoral calculus. 
Scholars could demonstrate that EU-related attitudes ranging from general 
support for European unification to particular issues like the support for 
Turkey’s EU membership influence voting in national elections (e.g. Schoen 
2008; Tillman 2004; de Vries 2007). They could also establish that parties 
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follow these incentives and adjust their positions on EU integration, or at least 
try to influence opinion on integration (e.g. Carruba 2001; Hellström 2008; 
Schmitt and Thomassen 2000; Steenbergen et al. 2007). However, these studies 
remained in the sphere of diffuse, ideological party positions (declared in 
manifestos or perceived by experts) and could not determine whether the 
electoral connection is strong enough to influence governments’ actual 
legislative behaviour at the EU level. The only evidence of responsiveness 
regarding EU legislative behaviour stems from a few recent studies that 
investigate ‘systemic responsiveness’ as the link between public support for 
integration and the amount of EU legislation passed (e.g. as total number of 
legislative acts or acts per policy area). These studies have yielded 
inconclusive results with some analyses finding clear responsiveness patterns 
and others reporting very limited evidence of any representational linkage 
(Arnold and de Vries 2009; Bolstad 2015; Toshkov 2011; De Vries and Arnold 
2011). Here, I move beyond vague measures like ‘amount of legislation’ and 
investigate governments’ responsiveness regarding the actual substance of 
concrete pieces of EU legislation.  
 
 
Modes of Responsiveness in the EU’s Two-Dimensional 
Space 
 
In contrast to the classical US studies of responsiveness that assume the 
political space to be defined by a single liberal-conservative (or left-right) 
conflict dimension, responsiveness in EU policy-making has to be assessed on 
two dimensions. Scholars widely agree that the EU’s political space is – at 
least on a cognitive, analytical level – two-dimensional (Hix 1999; Marks and 
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Steenbergen 2002). Conventional left-right conflicts can be accompanied and 
partly crossed by questions of more or less integration. Many EU policy-
making controversies will naturally connect to left-right constituted by an 
economic component summarising conflicts over state intervention and 
regulation, a cultural component involving, for instance, immigration and 
human rights, as well as post-materialist vs. materialist value conflicts such as 
environmentalism.2 Examples range from the liberalisation of former state 
company sectors (like postal services), over visa facilitations, to the treatment 
of laying hens in farms. However, some pieces of legislation also touch upon 
pro-anti integration conflicts as they concern jurisdictional architecture and 
have direct implications for the scope and level of EU authority or for the 
EU’s geographical inclusiveness. Examples range from the Commission’s 
authority in enforcing budgetary discipline to the harmonisation of existing 
national safety regulations regarding the transport of dangerous goods. 
 
I argue that while the electoral incentives flowing from national elections are 
fundamental for responsiveness of governments in EU policy-making, 
governments will apply different modes of responsiveness on each of the two 
dimensions. This is due to the different roles the dimensions play in domestic 
electoral competition. On one side, economic, cultural, and value-based left-
right conflicts are central for electoral competition throughout most parts of 
the EU. Parties cluster along the left-right dimension in virtually all countries 
(Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012; J. D. Huber and Inglehart 1995), they use left-
right and its variants to define their stances on newly emerging dimensions 
(Marks, Nelson, and Edwards 2006), and left-right is deeply rooted in 
underlying societal cleavages that are not only present in Western but also in                                                         2 Hence, left-right is understood here as a macro-dimension that does not only capture economic left-right but also the ‘new politics’ dimension or GAL/TAN. Clearly, these dimensions are not identical but they are related on the level of political actors and their underlying issues influence 
voters’ left-right self-placement (see next section). 
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large parts of Eastern Europe (Whitefield 2002). In turn, voters’ preferences on 
left-right conflicts remain highly influential for vote choice in East and West 
(van der Brug, Franklin, and Tóka 2008). Hence, left-right is a highly salient 
and stable dimension of electoral competition. 
 
On the other side, the role of integration conflicts for electoral competition is 
much less stable and universal. As of yet integration conflicts do not represent 
a fully matured cleavage with strong social and institutional backing in the 
classical Lipset-Rokkan (1967) sense, but they are rather an often fragile, 
evolving issue of electoral competition (Carmines and Stimson 1986; 1989; 
1993). Whether conflicts over integration become electorally salient is highly 
conditional on factors such as mobilisation activities of strategic politicians, 
external disruptions (e.g. economic crises), or local institutional variations 
(e.g. referendum constraints). Chance is a major force behind these factors and 
it renders the evolution of the integration issue neither universal, nor 
unidirectional, nor necessarily permanent (Carmines and Stimson 1993: 158-
162; Van der Eijk and Franklin 2007). Instead, it is more likely that electoral 
competition over integration is intermittent, fluctuating over time and across 
countries (e.g. Stevens 2013). 
 
These differences have important implications for the mode in which 
governments will approach responsiveness. In essence, responsiveness on 
left-right should be a routine task for the government to secure office in the 
next elections (‘routine mode’). Governments’ efforts in that respect can be 
highly structured, long-term planned, and adapted to the domestic 
institutional framework. This is efficient as there is no doubt that left-right 
will remain electorally salient. Therefore, factors immediately linked to 
national elections and the electoral cycle will influence responsiveness. In 
contrast, responsiveness on pro-anti integration should be highly contingent 
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on times and en-vironments in which the integration issue evolves and 
develops electoral salience (or has the potential to do so). Governments’ 
responsiveness efforts will be rather ‘ad hoc’ as the issue’s long-term fate 
remains largely uncertain (‘ad hoc mode’). Therefore, factors increasing the 
salience of the EU issue will prompt responsiveness. 
 
 
Dimension-Specific Hypotheses about Responsiveness 
 
To test these claims I derive a series of dimension-specific hypotheses that 
allow determining whether governments systematically react to electoral 
incentives that are associated with different factors on each dimension. 
Starting with left-right governments’ responsiveness efforts should vary with 
factors directly linked to national elections. I highlight the role of the electoral 
cycle and the electoral system. 
 
Firstly, if governments align and routinely plan their responsiveness efforts 
on left-right with a close eye on elections, they should vary over the course of 
the electoral cycle. For instance, scholars could show that US presidents are 
more responsive in the second half of their terms when elections are coming 
closer (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004). Similar positive effects of the 
proximity of elections for responsiveness to constituents could be 
demonstrated for US senators, assemblymen, or judges (Elling 1982; Huber 
and Gordon 2004; Kuklinski 1978; Lindstädt and Vander Wielen 2011). 
Tailoring responsiveness efforts according to the electoral cycle is effective as 
voters’ gratitude for government action declines over time and good deeds 
before elections count more than those in the distant past (Bechtel and 
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Hainmueller 2011). Moreover, voters may use the period leading up to the 
elections as a heuristic for government performance overall and “substitute 
the end for the whole” (Healy and Lenz 2014: 33). The first hypothesis is 
therefore: 
 
H1: Governments will be more responsive to domestic public opinion regarding left-
right conflicts as national election dates come closer.  
 
Secondly, if governments mainly consider the next elections when responding 
on left-right, electoral systems should make a difference. The major line of 
thought in this respect has focused on seat-vote elasticities under different 
electoral formula (see Chang, Kayser, and Rogowski 2008; Kayser and 
Lindstädt n.d.; Rogowski and Kayser 2002). The argument is that marginal 
changes in vote shares will typically transform into larger changes in seat 
shares in majoritarian electoral systems than in proportional. This should 
generally create stronger incentives for governments to follow voters’ interest 
as small vote losses could dismantle government majorities.  
 
However, there are two caveats concerning this general conclusion. Firstly, 
the idea that seat-vote elasticities are strictly greater in SMD than in PR 
systems only holds if the two major parties are at eye level. If one party 
dominates by a wide vote margin the seat-vote elasticity can approach 0 
under SMD, while it will be very close to 1 under PR in all situations of 
dominance (Chang, Kayser, and Rogowski 2008: 749-750; Hobolt and 
Klemmensen 2008: 313-314). Secondly, SMD also creates incentives for 
governments to over-respond to the preferences and opinions of citizens in 
marginal districts that may often markedly differ from centrist or average 
opinion (e.g. Persson and Tabellini 2003; Rickard 2012). 
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Wlezien and Soroka (2012: 1413-1414) have suggested that coalition dynamics 
are another factor impeding responsiveness in PR systems. While SMD 
normally produces single-party governments that are versatile in reacting to 
(changing) opinion, PR’s multi-party governments have to engage in 
coordination that will involve deterrent transaction costs. In total, I expect 
SMD to have advantages for responsiveness: 
 
H2: Governments will be more responsive to domestic public opinion regarding left-
right conflicts in majoritarian electoral systems.  
 
Turning to the pro-anti integration dimension governments’ responsiveness 
should be associated with factors increasing the salience of integration. I 
discuss two fundamental factors here: parties’ mobilisation activities and 
events related to integration. 
 
First, as party elites play a crucial role in mobilizing integration in the 
domestic public sphere, and thus making it relevant to voters’ choices, 
government responsiveness should be higher when parties increase their 
emphasis on integration (Börzel and Risse 2009; Carmines and Stimson 1986, 
1989; van der Eijk and Franklin 2007). The point can be best illustrated by 
stressing the influence of political elites on media coverage of pro-anti 
integration conflicts. While left-right issues often enter domestic media 
naturally as they connect to people’s daily life experiences (e.g. 
unemployment, immigration), emerging policy dimensions often lack such 
inherent news factors (Soroka 2002). This is precisely a consequence of their 
comparative lack of firm basis in pre-existing social cleavages. In the case of 
pro-anti integration, the abstract and unobtrusive nature of questions of 
authority and competence allocation between national and EU institutions 
needs some additional vehicle to become newsworthy. Media studies confirm 
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that this role can be played by political elites communicating their stances on 
these issues and reframing them to better fit the domestic context, which 
induces media to put them on the agenda (Adam 2007; Boomgaarden et al. 
2013; Van der Pas and Vliegenthart 2015). In turn, increased levels of (media) 
information on integration have been found to facilitate ‘EU issue voting’ (e.g. 
Hobolt and Wittrock 2011; Hobolt 2005; de Vries et al. 2011). 
 
I therefore expect that wherever domestic parties increase their emphasis on 
pro-anti integration, this will be related to higher public salience of such 
issues and induce governments to be more responsive:3 
 
H3: Governments will be more responsive to domestic public opinion on pro-anti 
integration conflicts wherever parties increase their emphasis on such issues.  
 
Second, high-profile events related to EU integration should increase the 
salience of integration to the public and therefore prompt government’s 
responsiveness. Similar to party emphasis on integration, events can act as a 
vehicle for pro-anti integration conflicts to enter the public sphere. Research 
has demonstrated that, in particular, extraordinary and infrequent events like 
referendums on EU integration, elections to the European Parliament, the 
introduction of the euro, or holding the EU’s presidency temporarily increase 
the coverage of EU politics in national media (Boomgaarden et al. 2010; 
Vetters, Jentges, and Trenz 2009). These events often trigger intense public 
debates about pro-anti integration that range from questions of adopting new 
EU treaties (e.g. in referendums) to stopping legislation that challenges 
national sovereignty (e.g. during a presidency). In the specific case of                                                         3 European mainstream parties have proven rather reluctant to emphasising pro-anti integration issues due to latent internal divisions and coalition considerations (e.g. Green-Pedersen 2012; Steenbergen and Scott 2004; van de Wardt 2014). However, the salience of integration for parties is clearly fluctuating across countries and time. 
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referendums, research has shown that such debates clarify actors’ positions to 
the public, affect public evaluations of leaders’ performance (de Vreese 2004), 
and increase issue voting on pro-anti integration in the next national elections 
(de Vries 2009). 
 
Therefore, I expect governments to temporarily increase their responsiveness 
around such events: 
 
H4: Governments will be more responsive to domestic public opinion on pro-anti 
integration conflicts around major events related to EU integration.  
 
 
Data and Measurement 
 
To test these hypotheses I investigate responsiveness as the impact of public 
opinion on national ministers’ policy positions on concrete pieces of 
legislation discussed in the Council.4 I measure the dependent variable with 
the Decision-making in the European Union (DEU) dataset that contains spatial 
information on governments’ initial positions regarding 331 controversial 
issues from the 1994-1999 and the 2004-2009 legislative terms (Thomson et al. 
2006, 2012). DEU is based on 349 semi-structured interviews with experts 
from member states’ permanent representations and EU institutions, who 
were asked to report legislative issues that raised controversy and locate 
governments on corresponding spatial policy scales. It is the most widely-
used dataset on EU decision-making and has been employed in a diverse                                                         4 An online appendix including an overview of all data sources, descriptive statistics, codebook instructions, and results of further robustness checks can be obtained from the author upon request. 
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range of applications. Importantly, DEU is basically a selection of the most 
salient issues in EU policy-making as proposals had to be mentioned in 
European media and actors had to be divided on key issues regarding the 
proposal to be included in the data.5  
 
In order to relate the DEU policy scales to the two dimensions of interest, an 
original coding scheme was developed to identify controversies that related to 
substantive left-right or pro-anti integration conflicts. The guiding principle 
was to construct categories for both dimensions that correspond to the DEU 
issues and at the same time closely reflect our best knowledge from the public 
opinion literature about what citizens associate with the concepts ‘left-right’ 
and ‘pro-anti integration’ (see below). This guarantees a high substantive 
relevance between the dependent and independent variable. The resulting 
scheme consists of eight categories representing the left-right dimension; they 
cover conflicts ranging from economic regulation, over consumer and 
environmental protection, to human and civil rights. Four categories capture 
the integration dimension, covering aspects ranging from harmonisation over 
EU level authority to the delaying of EU legislative acts.  
 
The coding of the DEU issues reveals that about 61% of the issues fall into at 
least one left-right category and 31% into at least one pro-anti integration 
category (with 12% relevant on both dimensions). 22% did neither relate to 
any left-right nor to any pro-anti integration category (e.g. they related to 
geographical cleavages).6 This confirms the claim that left-right and pro-anti 
integration are the two main dimensions in EU policy-making representing                                                         5 Tracking governments’ behaviour in the Council with DEU is therefore broadly comparable to tracking American legislators on the basis of ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) or similar scores that also focus on salient, key policy issues (see Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). 6 The inter-coder reliability for the decision whether an issue related to a dimension or not was 
assessed with the help of Krippendorff’s alpha, which is 0.88 for the left-right and 0.73 for the pro-anti integration dimension. 
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78% of all policy controversies, with left-right as the primary dimension being 
about twice as salient as pro-anti integration. Wherever necessary the DEU 
scale with a predefined range of 0-100 was linearly transformed so as to 
ensure that the most ‘right’ and the most ‘integrationist’ option respectively 
are represented by 100 and the most left / least integrationist by 0. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the dependent variable with governments’ positions on 
two exemplary issues from the data. Left-right issues are illustrated with a 
proposal concerning the inclusion of the aviation industry in the EU’s CO2 
emission trading system (COD/2006/304). In this case, the amount of emission 
allowances to be allocated to the industry was contested with some 
governments opting for a smaller and others for a larger amount (left vs. right 
position). The example of a pro-anti integration issue concerned the 
Commission’s discretion in applying budgetary discipline in the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CNS/2004/164). Governments were divided about the 
degree of authority they should delegate to the Commission in this respect.  
 
To measure public opinion as the primary independent variable, I use survey 
data from the Standard Eurobarometer series by linearly interpolating 
opinion between the six-monthly surveys. In line with common practice in the 
responsiveness literature, I use lagged opinion (by six months) to reflect the 
causal ordering, in which governments first observe opinion and 
subsequently react to it. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the dependent variable 
  Notes: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom 
 
Public opinion on left-right conflicts is operationalised as the country’s 
average of the ideological self-placement item that asks respondents to 
identify their own ideological position on a scale ranging from 1 (left) to 10 
(right). Scholars have demonstrated that these self-placements are 
systematically related to attitudes on economic, cultural, and materialist vs. 
post-materialist conflicts (J. D. Huber 1989; Knutsen 1997), including specific 
issues such as immigration (De Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013), civil 
liberties and human rights (Cohrs et al. 2005, 2007), and a variety of 
100: Based on an 
emission level closer 
to the start date of 
the regulation 
CY, CZ, EE, HU, LV, 
LT, MT, PL, SI, SK 
What are governments’ positions on the total CO2 emission allowances for the aviation industry? 
Left Right 
30: 95% of the 
2005-07 annual 
average emissions 
DE 
Position 10:  
Annual average 
of 2004-06  
emissions 
AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, 
EL, IE, IT, LU, NL, 
PT, ES, SE, UK 
UK, SE 
What are governments’ positions on the application of budgetary discipline in the CAP? 
Anti integration Pro integration 
50: Commission 
should have 
influence, but 
Council should 
dominate 
LU 
Position 0: Council 
decides on how 
much and which 
payments to reduce 
AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, 
EL, IE, IT, PT, ES 
80: Commission 
should decide in 
most cases, in 
some the Council 
100: Commission should 
cut money to stay under 
ceiling and decide how 
much and where to cut 
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environmental issues (Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug 2012; Neumayer 2004; 
Skrentny 1993; Thalmann 2004). Therefore, these placements are a substantive 
measure of the public’s left-right preferences. In line with the extant literature, 
public opinion on pro-anti integration is measured as support for EU 
membership (‘Generally speaking, do you think (your country’s membership 
in the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor 
bad?’). Support is operationalised as the difference between respondents 
answering the EU is a good thing minus those thinking the EU is a bad thing 
divided by all responses per country. This measure has been shown to 
correspond with more specific attitudes on integration as well as with actual 
EU policy activity (e.g. Bolstad 2015; Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Toshkov 2011). 
The moderating factors hypothesised in H1 to H4 are measured as follows. 
First, to test whether the electoral cycle influences government responsiveness 
I operationalise the distance to the next, scheduled national legislative 
elections in 100 day units.7 Second, the impact of majoritarian electoral 
systems is measured with a variable that is 0 for PR and mixed systems with 
disproportionality correction, 1 for mixed systems that do not correct 
disproportionality arising from the majoritarian part (Lithuania), and 2 for 
pure SMD plurality or two-round systems (the UK and France).8 Third, 
whether an increase in parties’ emphasis on EU integration is related to 
stronger responsiveness is measured with the help of the Comparative 
Manifesto Project’s (CMP) database (Volkens et al. 2013). This is 
operationalised as the seat-weighted average percentage of quasi-sentences 
parliamentary parties devote to EU integration (positive as well as negative 
statements) in their electoral manifestos. To capture times in which 
integration is politicised, I linearly interpolate over time and measure the 
                                                        7 Results do not change when coding the distance to the next elections that really occurred, i.e . to account for early elections. 8 I obtain the same results when using a simple dummy for SMD systems. 
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change in party emphasis over the last two years.9 Fourth, to determine the 
effects of major EU-related events I use a dummy variable that is 1 six months 
before and after the following events: national referendums on integration, 
signing of EU treaties, accession to the EU, introduction of the euro currency, 
elections to the European Parliament, holding the Council presidency. 
 
In order to ascertain which mechanism – rational anticipation or electoral 
turnover – is responsible for any responsiveness found, I include measures of 
government parties’ promised positions on left-right and pro-anti integration 
at the last elections from the CMP. For left-right I use the CMP’s summative 
RILE measure, and for pro-anti integration I take the difference between 
positive and negative quasi-sentences on the EU. Aggregated government 
positions are obtained by seat-weighting. The magnitude by which these 
measures reduce the coefficients on public opinion gauges the part of 
responsiveness that is induced directly by elections through turnover. In turn, 
the remaining effect is independent of the last election outcome and the 
composition of government but occurs during the legislative term as rational 
anticipation (Stimson 1999).  
 
In addition, I control for several factors that are known to influence 
governments’ position-taking in EU policy-making and might at the same 
time have non-trivial relationships with public opinion. Most importantly, I 
account for a potentially relevant redistribution cleavage (rich vs. poor 
countries) with a measure of countries’ net contribution to the EU budget (€ 
per capita) as well as a natural log of GDP per capita (purchasing power 
parity $ of 2011) (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2014; Zimmer, Schneider, and 
Dobbins 2005). Second, I account for a potential centre-periphery cleavage                                                         9 As elections occur in varying frequency across countries, I do not look at the change from the last manifesto but use linear interpolation. Operationalising the change over four years yields the same results. 
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with a dummy variable for whether a country is part of the Economic and 
Monetary Union or not. Third, I broadly capture the idea that member states 
try to ‘upload’ domestic policies to the European level (e.g. Börzel 2002) with 
government’s social benefits payments as percentage of GDP as well as a 
measure of domestic economic freedom from the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom of the World dataset (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall 2013). Moreover, 
I incorporate an ongoing debate about the relationship between the economy 
and opinion (e.g. Ferguson, Kellstedt, and Linn 2013) by controlling for 
national unemployment (as ILO defined) and inflation rates (in terms of 
consumer prices). Thereby, I ensure that any significant relationship between 
opinion and policy positions is more than a reflection of macro-movements in 
the economy. All data sources are linked on the date the Commission 
transmitted the relevant proposal to the Council.  
 
 
Analysis and Results 
 
To model the relationship between governments’ policy positions and 
opinion, I use mixed effects regressions. All models include random intercepts 
for the policy issue in question, the legislative proposal from which the issue 
emanated, and the country that took the position. Moreover, I include a 
random slope that allows the public opinion effect to vary in strength between 
the different policy issues. The hypotheses H1 to H4 are tested by including 
interaction terms between public opinion and the respective moderating 
variable.  
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Hence, all models take the following general form:10 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛽3
∗ (𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 ×  𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟) + ⋯ +  𝑢0𝑖 + 𝑢0𝑝 + 𝑢0𝑐 + 𝑢1𝑖 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛
+  𝜖 
 
Where the index p is for legislative proposals, i for issues (nested in 
proposals), and c for countries. Hence, 𝑢0𝑖, 𝑢0𝑝, and 𝑢0𝑐 represent the 
respective random intercepts, 𝑢1𝑖 the random slope on public opinion on the 
issue level, and 𝜖 the position-specific error term.  
 
In a first step, I restrict the sample to all issues that relate to left-right conflicts. 
Table 1 shows the major results. Model 1A regresses governments’ policy 
positions (0 ‘most left’ to 100 ‘most right’ option) on left-right opinion and the 
control variables. The results show that opinion exerts a significant effect on 
governments’ position-taking in the Council. For a unit change in opinion to 
the right, governments shift their policy positions by 6.56 points on the left-
right policy scale on average. Model 2A adds the government parties’ 
promised left-right position at the last elections as the CMP’s RILE score to 
parse out effects of electoral turnover. The results show that governments 
whose parties made ideologically right-leaning electoral promises, also 
deliver more rightist policy positions in the Council as one would expect. 
However, the coefficient on public opinion is virtually unchanged, which 
indicates that in order to forestall future electoral sanctions governments 
respond to public opinion beyond their electoral promises.  
                                                         10 Where time series data is available, responsiveness can be studied on the basis of first differences or distributed lags models. However, the DEU data does not qualify as a time series, mainly due to a large gap between 1999 and 2004. I therefore define responsiveness here in a static sense, which is common practice where time series data is lacking (see Gilens 2012; Lax and Phillips 2009, 2012). 
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Table 1: Responsiveness on left-right dimension 
  Model 1A Model 2A Model 3A Model 4A Model 5A Left-right opinion 6.562 6.246 14.765 5.541 14.018  (3.288)** (3.148)** (4.663)*** (3.340)* (4.763)*** Government left-right position  0.145 (0.069)** 0.189 (0.071)*** 0.119 (0.070)* 0.163 (0.072)**  Days to elections    5.890   5.924    (2.353)**  (2.357)** Days to elections x Left-right opinion   -1.101 (0.444)**  -1.111 (0.445)**       Electoral system    -93.980 -93.603     (44.056)** (43.802)** Electoral system x Left-right opinion    18.708 (8.740)** 18.563 (8.692)** Net contribution to EU budget  -1.392  (0.857) -1.444 (0.820)* -1.640 (0.819)** -1.469 (0.832)* -1.674 (0.830)**       GDP per capita (ln) -11.327 -9.980 -10.131 -9.834 -10.038  (5.192)** (4.949)** (4.910)** (5.047)* (5.010)** EMU membership 2.397 2.345 2.661 2.829 3.113  (2.579) (2.513) (2.504) (2.548) (2.539) Social benefits 0.714 0.594 0.663 0.785 0.863  (0.496) (0.468) (0.466) (0.482) (0.479)* Economic freedom 4.255 4.008 4.223 4.135 4.443  (1.817)** (1.727)** (1.716)** (1.820)** (1.810)** Unemployment rate -0.456 -0.513 -0.562 -0.415 -0.467  (0.346) (0.335) (0.334)* (0.343) (0.341) Inflation rate -0.942 -0.918 -1.036 -0.862 -0.988  (0.717) (0.706) (0.704) (0.711) (0.711) Constant 102.518 94.266 48.187 91.744 45.935  (58.887)* (56.118)* (58.881) (57.358) (59.964) Country intercepts (st. dev.) 5.405 4.769 4.667 4.935 4.823 Proposal intercepts (st. dev.) 12.281 12.348 12.394 12.256 12.296 Issue intercepts   (st. dev.) 0.009 0.016 0.016 0.010 0.009 Issue opinion slopes (st. dev.) 3.540 3.536 3.541 3.536 3.541 Notes: All are mixed effects regressions with 26 countries, 84 proposals, 183 policy issues, and N = 3,122;  No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures; Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
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Models 3A-5A investigate whether governments apply a ‘routine mode’ when 
responding on left-right as detailed in the theory section. Model 3A tests 
whether governments increase their responsiveness as national elections 
approach (H1). Indeed, there is a significant positive effect of electoral 
proximity on responsiveness. The closer elections are, the more governments 
consider public opinion when taking policy positions in the Council. Model 
4A assesses the impact of electoral systems on responsiveness by allowing the 
opinion effect to vary between PR, mixed systems without correction, and 
pure SMD systems (H2). It provides evidence that governments in 
majoritarian electoral systems are indeed more responsive to left-right 
preferences than their counterparts in proportional electoral systems. In fact, 
the main term on public opinion relating to pure PR systems is only weakly 
significant at the 10% level. Model 5A tests whether the conditioning effects of 
the electoral cycle and the electoral system are independent of each other by 
including both interaction effects. The results show that both interaction terms 
remain significant at the 5% level. Hence, the proximity of the next elections 
and electoral system type independently condition responsiveness.  
 
To illustrate these results Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of public opinion 
depending on the days to the next elections and separately for PR and SMD 
electoral systems. We can see that in countries with PR systems public 
opinion does not have any significant influence on governments’ position-
taking when planned elections lie more than 650 days in the future. However, 
from around 2 to 1½ years before the elections governments clearly consider 
public opinion when taking policy positions in the Council. In turn, 
governments facing SMD systems at home are responsive from about 4 years 
before the next elections and when elections are imminent they change their 
policy positions by up to 50 points for a unit change in opinion.  
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Figure 2: Marginal effect of opinion by electoral cycle and system 
 
 
In a second step, I restrict the sample to all issues relating to conflicts about 
pro-anti integration. The results are reported in Table 2. Model 1B estimates 
the adopted policy position (0 ‘least integrationist’ to 100 ‘most integrationist’ 
option) as a function of pro-anti integration opinion and the control variables. 
In line with the findings on left-right, governments’ position-taking on pro-
anti integration also responds to public opinion with a significant coefficient 
at the 5% level. The more supportive the public is of the country’s EU 
membership, the more likely it is that the government adopts positions that 
imply more EU authority, more harmonisation, or more EU task expansion. 
Model 2B demonstrates that like on the left-right dimension responsiveness 
on pro-anti integration is also a result of rational anticipation as opinion 
impacts on government positions even if controlling for the electoral promises 
of the cabinet parties.11                                                         11 In addition, the insignificant coefficient on the CMP measure indicates that government parties that make pro integrationist electoral promises do not adopt more integrationist policy positions. This supports the claim that governments do not routinely engage in their representative function on pro-anti integration. 
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Table 2: Responsiveness on pro-anti integration dimension 
  Model 1B Model 2B Model 3B Model 4B Model 5B Integration opinion 15.690 16.009 19.430 2.963 5.991  (7.666)** (7.783)** (7.601)** (9.360) (9.277) Government integration position  0.125 (0.527) 0.647   (0.544) 0.132 (0.522) 0.666  (0.541)       Party salience   -4.252  -3.314    (2.973)  (3.008) Party salience x Integration opinion   17.431 (6.928)**  15.456 (7.039)**       EU-related event     -12.344 -11.037     (4.762)*** (4.819)** EU-related event x Integration opinion    22.301 (9.394)** 22.602 (9.428)**       Net contribution to EU budget  1.466- (0.870)* 1.486- (0.874)* -1.515 (0.832)* -1.378 (0.857) -1.406 (0.821)* GDP per capita (ln) 2.556 2.540 5.333 2.894 5.776  (5.526) (5.524) (5.357) (5.432) (5.310) EMU membership -1.576 -1.661 -1.561 -1.185 -1.337  (2.925) (2.946) (2.918) (2.904) (2.889) Social benefits 0.774 0.804 0.815 0.829 0.797  (0.595) (0.607) (0.591) (0.596) (0.584) Economic freedom -0.737 -0.738 -0.608 -0.595 -0.512  (2.084) (2.083) (1.987) (2.042) (1.960) Unemployment rate -0.320 -0.352 -0.285 -0.339 -0.257  (0.376) (0.400) (0.386) (0.393) (0.382) Inflation rate -0.698 -0.702 -0.460 -0.518 -0.318  (0.859) (0.859) (0.857) (0.856) (0.856) Constant 14.113 13.684 -19.778 14.976 -18.995  (55.840) (55.846) (54.262) (54.862) (53.814) Country intercepts (st. dev.) 2.833 2.827 2.227 2.582 2.044 Proposal intercepts (st. dev.) 0.003 0.080 0.041 0.020 0.014 Issue intercepts   (st. dev.) 26.772 26.748 26.666 26.718 26.640 Issue opinion slopes (st. dev.) 16.344 16.326 17.272 15.719 16.712 Notes: All are mixed effects regressions with 24 countries, 68 proposals, 94 policy issues, and N = 1,537;  No observations for Cyprus, Malta, and Latvia due to missing CMP measures; Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Models 3B-5B investigate whether governments employ an ‘ad hoc mode’ when 
responding on pro-anti integration. Model 3B tests whether governments are 
more responsive in case domestic parties increase the electoral salience of pro-
anti integration in their manifestos (H3). The hypothesis is supported by a 
significant interaction term indicating that governments care more about 
opinion when EU integration is politicised in the party system. Model 4B tests 
whether major events related to EU integration play a pivotal role in making 
governments wary of public opinion on pro-anti integration (H4). The results 
entirely support this conjecture: In fact, while the interaction term is 
significant, the main term on opinion has now dropped close to zero 
indicating that governments only consider opinion around such events but 
disregard it at other times. Model 5B including both interactions confirms 
these findings. 
 
Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of public opinion depending on the change 
in parties’ emphasis on integration and separately for times with or without 
an event related to EU integration. While in times with no event strong 
politicisation by parties (+1.7 percentage points quasi-sentences on EU 
integration) is needed to make governments responsive, ministers almost 
always consider opinion around events related to EU integration (up to -0.6 
percentage points decrease in party emphasis). 
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of opinion by party salience and event context 
 
 
What do these opinion effects on the left-right and pro-anti integration 
position scales mean in a real world context? While there is no 
straightforward answer to this question as the substantive meaning of the 
position scale varies from issue to issue, I point to two helpful considerations. 
Firstly, these effects can be interpreted relative to average distances in policy 
positions between national delegations. For instance, the average distance on 
the left-right scale between the UK, that advocated more ‘rightist’ policy 
positions, and France, with more ‘leftist’ positions, is about 10 scale points 
(61-62 against 51-52 respectively). Considering the opinion effect of 35-50 
points in SMD systems with long-run standard deviations of left-right 
opinion between 0.1-0.2, regular fluctuations towards leftist opinion are 
sufficient to make the UK government adopt positions like its French 
counterpart. An example for pro-anti integration is to compare Ireland that 
has largely adopted integrationist policy positions, and the Czech Republic 
that has been more reluctant. An average of 13 scale points separates them. 
Given an opinion effect of 20-85 points in most situations around EU-related 
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events and long-run standard deviations of support for membership around 
0.1, changes of policy positions by 4-16 scale points are quite frequent. Hence, 
under Eurosceptic tides of public opinion the Irish government that, for 
instance, had to face 8 EU referendums throughout history, is predicted to 
agree with the Czech delegation.  
 
Second, the substantive impact of opinion can be exemplified by predicting 
governments’ positions on specific policy issues from the data. As an example 
for left-right I use an issue from a directive on common standards for 
returning illegal immigrants (COD/2005/167). A key controversy on this 
directive was for how long member states should be allowed to detain illegal 
immigrants that have received a deportation decision. As an example for pro-
anti integration I draw on the member states’ decision to establish the EU’s 
Employment Committee (CNS/1999/192) that is an advisory committee to the 
Employment and Social Affairs (EPSCO) Council configuration. In this case, it 
was contested whether the committee should be located in the Council’s or 
the Commission’s sphere of influence.  
 
Figure 4 plots the models’ (5A/5B) predicted positions at the observed values 
and connects them with an arrow to the prediction when shifting public 
opinion two long-run standard deviations towards rightist or pro integration 
opinion. The values of the random effects are predicted with empirical Bayes 
methods. While for some governments the model predictions are very similar 
under the changed opinion scenario, public opinion displays a strong 
leverage in a number of contexts. For instance, the French position on 
detention periods for illegal immigrants would have been predicted 15 scale 
points towards longer periods, which would have meant additional 3-4 
months of detention in substantive terms. The next French elections were 
almost two years away at this point. On the institutional location of the 
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Employment Committee, which was discussed shortly after the 1999 
European elections, Belgium is predicted to shift its position by 13 scale points 
towards higher Commission influence. In substantive terms, this distance 
represented the difference between balanced influence of the institutions or a 
clear advantage of one. 
 
Figure 4: Substantive meaning of opinion effect with examples 
Note: Arrow connects predicted position at observed values with hypothetical prediction when increasing opinion by two long-run standard deviations (average within-country standard deviation, 1990-2013). Values for random components are obtained by empirical Bayes methods.   
 
 
In total, these considerations show that public opinion can exert a substantive 
influence on legislative negotiations in the Council. This is particularly 
evident when considering that with France and the UK two of the three ‘big’ 
EU governments face majoritarian electoral systems at home, and that about 
50% of all positions on pro-anti integration in the period investigated were 
adopted in a context of major events related to integration. In total, the 
models predict significant marginal effects of opinion for about 50% of all 
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observations on the left-right and 40% of all observations on the pro-anti 
integration dimension.12 
 
 
Robustness Checks and Causal Inference 
 
This section reports results of robustness checks addressing three types of 
concerns. All results are provided in Table 3. First, I address the theoretical 
concern that the moderators of responsiveness may not be dimension-specific. 
Instead, the salience of EU integration triggered by parties and EU-related 
events could ‘spill-over’ and make governments also more responsive on the 
left-right dimension of EU policy-making. Similarly, governments could also 
structure their responsiveness efforts on pro-anti integration with a view to 
national elections (e.g. as they expect enduring public salience of integration). 
To test these assertions I re-estimate the final Models 5a + 5b interchanging 
the moderators between the dimensions. The results strongly support the 
claim of dimension specificity. The only weakly significant interaction term is 
that between left-right opinion and events. However, it indicates that left-
right opinion is less considered by governments before and after events 
related to integration, which might simply show that governments shift their 
focus towards the pro-anti integration dimension in such times. 
 
Second, I address concerns about the distribution of the dependent variable. 
Since a significant fraction of DEU policy scales are binary (e.g. the legislative 
                                                        12 The findings on the control variables. On left-right, the results support the presence of a 
redistribution cleavage, with the ‘rich’ governments advocating more leftist policy positions. Patterns of uploading of domestic policies are also partially visible as governments with more freedom of business at home take more rightist positions. Importantly, I find no control variable significant on pro-anti integration, which underscores that this dimension is less rooted – not only in national but also – in cross-national cleavages. 
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conflict only offered two options), the extreme values 0 and 100 are 
overrepresented rendering the distribution skewed at both tails. In order to 
see whether this non-normality drives any results I create a second, 
dichotomised version of the dependent variable: If governments took more 
leftist / less integrationist positions between 0 and 49 this is coded as 0 and 
more rightist / integrationist positions between 50 and 100 as 1. The final 
models are re-estimated using mixed effects logistic regression. Again, this 
different specification yields qualitatively identical results. 
 
Third, I address two concerns regarding measurement. With regard to left-
right, the cross-national comparability of the left-right self-placement as a 
measure of opinion could be criticised. In particular, studies suggest that the 
meaning of left-right may differ between Western and Eastern Europe as 
citizens with strong conservation and security values tend to place themselves 
on the right side of the scale in Western Europe but often to the left in post-
communist countries (Aspelund, Lindeman, and Verkasalo 2013; Piurko, 
Schwartz, and Davidov 2011; Thorisdottir et al. 2007). This is caused by 
respondents associating the communist past with ‘left’ ideology as well as 
traditionalism and security. A re-estimation of the final model excluding the 8 
post-communist countries demonstrates that this potential measurement 
variance does not drive any results.  
 
With regard to pro-anti integration, a central question is whether the 
moderators investigated are adequate proxies of public salience. Sometimes 
other EU-related events than those selected may trigger salience and not 
every referendum or EU presidency may actually resonate in the public 
sphere. Similarly, emphasis on EU integration in election manifestos hardly 
captures all mobilisation activities of parties and its quality as a proxy may be 
better around elections than during the term. In order to measure public 
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salience more directly, I create a measure from country reports in The Political 
Data Yearbook published annually by the European Journal of Political 
Research. In these reports, experts discuss the most important political issues 
that shaped the country’s political agenda in a given year. From this 
information I construct a dummy variable that is 1 for proposals published in 
reporting years in which at least one aspect of EU integration was mentioned 
as a salient issue by the experts. Interacting this alternative measure with 
opinion produces the same results: Responsiveness on pro-anti integration is 
triggered by public salience but absent otherwise. 
 
A remaining question is whether these relationships can be interpreted 
causally. The entire responsiveness literature is quite aware that elites’ 
priming, framing, and persuasion attempts are a potential source of 
‘simultaneity’ or even ‘reversed causality’, so that governments may more 
shape opinion than being influenced by it. However, most findings of this 
study point towards a bottom-up process. Most importantly, the relationship 
between opinion and governments’ positions only becomes significant with 
increasing electoral pressure in the domestic arena – be it an approaching 
election, an elastic electoral formula, or the increased electoral salience of 
integration due to party emphasis or EU events. As Jacobs and Shapiro (2000: 
43) have argued, manipulation of opinion by elites is the strategic choice in 
times of low electoral pressure but not if electoral incentives are imminent 
since then “it is less risky and faster to respond to public opinion than attempt 
to change it”. Hence, if elite-led dynamics were prevalent, we should detect 
the strongest relationships between opinion and positions distant from 
elections, in PR systems, and in times of low public salience of integration. 
This is precisely the opposite of what we find.  
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Table 3: Robustness checks 
  Interchanged moderators Dichotomous dependent 
variable 
Measurement concerns  Left-right Integration Left-right Integration Left-right Integration Opinion 11.757 9.468 0.914 0.267 9.229 6.128  (4.031)*** (11.970) (0.305)*** (0.698) (5.050)* (9.667) Government position 0.136 (0.071)* 0.046 (0.555)  0.012 (0.005)*** 0.053 (0.041) 0.156 (0.065)** 0.211 (0.531) Party salience 8.551   -0.105    (13.022)   (0.225)   Party salience x Opinion -1.345  (2.517)   0.931 (0.528)*          EU-related event 43.757 (22.332)*   -0.889 (0.368)**          EU-related event x Opinion -7.905  (4.242)*   1.951 (0.726)***          Days to elections  0.071 (0.488) 0.419 (0.161)**  7.019 (2.928)**     *    Days to elections x Opinion  0.420 (1.002) -0.079 (0.031)**  -1.332 (0.561)**         Electoral system  -2.792 (4.180) -5.093 (2.763)*  -149.573 (40.202)***         Electoral system x Opinion  9.102 (13.099) 1.027 (0.550)*  30.312 (8.066)***         Public salience      -6.964       (4.952) Public salience x Opinion      23.843 (10.164)**        Control variables All included All included All included All included All included All included Random effects All included All included All included All included All included All included Number of observations 2,964 1,537 3,122 1,537 2,535 1,515 
Notes: Mixed effects regression for ‘Interchanged moderators’ and ‘Measurement 
concerns’; Mixed effects logistic regression for  
‘Dichotomous dependent variable’; Number of countries, proposals and policy issues as above; Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Conclusion 
 
This analysis has demonstrated that democratic responsiveness is an 
important feature of legislative negotiations in the Council. It provides 
considerable evidence for two distinct modes of responsiveness: On 
legislative issues related to left-right conflicts governments have developed a 
routine of responding to opinion along the electoral cycle with varying 
strengths depending on the elasticity of vote-seat conversion they face. In 
turn, on pro-anti integration governments only spontaneously consider 
opinion in response to public salience that is triggered by party emphasis on 
integration as well as major events related to integration. The common root 
cause of responsiveness on both dimensions are incentives flowing from 
national elections. 
 
This responsiveness has substantive consequences. It can motivate 
governments to devote a few hundred more millions of funding to the EU’s 
education programme SOCRATES, to retain data from electronic 
communication services for a few months longer, or to move from unanimity 
to qualified majority voting in the implementation of the Dublin Convention 
on asylum seekers.  
 
Clearly, responsiveness in the Council is far from being universal as electoral 
incentives were only strong enough to induce significant responsiveness in 
about 40-50% of all observations in the sample. However, a careful reading of 
the responsiveness literature in domestic politics often reveals the very same 
conditional relationships between opinion and policy-makers’ actions. For 
instance, Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) have demonstrated that US 
Presidents are much less responsive to opinion in the first half of their term. 
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Similarly, scholars have established that public salience is a key prerequisite 
for responsiveness (Burstein 2006; Lax and Phillips 2009; Wlezien 2004). 
Accepting democracy in nation states as the standard to which we should 
compare the EU, the results then suggest that governments in the Council 
behave approximately as responsive to public demands as they and other top 
executives do in domestic politics. Differences between the two contexts are 
probably rather a question of the precise degree of responsiveness than of a 
fundamentally different logic at play. 
 
This has important implications for the debate about the EU’s democratic 
deficit as it supports the liberal intergovernmentalist conjecture that national 
governments – at least to some extent – defend public preferences in Brussels. 
In contrast, the generalised claim of the advocates of a democratic deficit that 
relationships between public preferences and EU policy-making will never be 
more than “happy coincidence” is not supported by this analysis. At least 
legislative negotiations in the Council are subject to a systematic connection to 
public sentiment. Governments in the Council are not benevolent 
authoritarians that do something for the people out of kindliness, but they 
strategically follow and shirk opinion depending on electoral incentives.  
 
Evidently, open questions remain: Most importantly, governments 
responding to the public in their negotiation positions are simply a necessary 
condition for the liberal intergovernmentalist defence of the EU. It does not 
guarantee that governments are able to actually realise public preferences in 
intra-institutional negotiations inside the Council and inter-institutional 
negotiations with the EP and the Commission. Future research should 
investigate the extent and conditions for substantive responsiveness to EU-
wide opinion at the stage of actual policy output. If such projects confirm the 
findings from this research, this will question the widely-held belief that the 
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EU is less democratic than national systems when assessed on the criterion of 
responsiveness. Certainly, this would not invalidate the claim that the EU 
suffers from some sort of democratic crisis – shrinking popular legitimacy of 
the integration project is the prime indication of this. However, it would shift 
the focus of debate either to alternative, more demanding assessment criteria 
of democratic rule such as issue congruence or to entirely novel angles of 
explaining gaps between popular feelings of legitimacy and measurable 
democratic quality. 
 
Finally, this research has important implications for the wider responsiveness 
literature. It demonstrates that responsiveness is not strictly limited to top 
profile policy questions like reforms of social security systems nor is it limited 
to domestic political arenas. Instead, the analysis could detect responsiveness 
in a context of comparatively low profile decisions and relatively high issue 
and policy-making complexity in an international political arena. This should 
encourage research on the boundary conditions for responsiveness. Without 
doubt, this study suggests that while being generally conditional on electoral 
incentives, responsiveness may be more resilient in adverse environments 
than many scholars could imagine. 
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